Water security in China: internal challenges, government strategies, and geopolitical impacts
Matilde de Souza and Maria Silveira
Abstract: This article analyzes water security in China, highlighting regulatory advances, institutional challenges, and geopolitical implications. It examines water governance, highlighting the need for greater cooperation and institutional integration to ensure the sustainability of water resources.
Water security is a country’s ability to sustainably guarantee access to water in adequate quantity and quality for its various uses. This concept gains relevance given the transformations imposed by climate change, rapid urban growth, and the pressures of the globalized economy on natural resources (IPEA, 2023; Jia & Li, 2021; Cook & Bakker, 2012). China is an emblematic case, given that the country faces complex challenges related to water security (Wang et al., 2017; Stratfor/RANE, 2024), one of the greatest being the unequal distribution of water within the territory: relative abundance in the south and scarcity in the north, which concentrates a large portion of the population, agricultural land, and industrial activity (Jia & Li, 2021; Wang et al., 2017).
China’s government projects and investments to redirect water from southern rivers to the north have been heavily criticized for their impacts. Furthermore, pollution and extreme weather events exacerbate the situation (Stratfor/RANE, 2024), as do the multiplicity and overlapping responsibilities of regulatory agencies, which generate institutional fragmentation and difficulties in political coordination (Liu & Richards, 2018). The inefficient use of water in agriculture and the low incorporation of technologies into its economy aggravate the situation (Wang et al., 2017).
Water security in China is anchored in institutional and regulatory instruments that, in recent decades, have evolved to accommodate new economic dynamics and respond to environmental pressures. Historically, water governance in China has been centralized in the state, and since 1949, development has been based on hydraulic projects for flood control, drought control, and irrigation. Water was considered a public good, without objective pricing (Jia & Li, 2021).
In the late 1970s, a reform incorporated principles of economic rationality, and since 1990, market mechanisms have been introduced, enabling the adoption of integrated management models under state supervision (Wang et al., 2017). Currently, the concept of ecological civilization guides official discourse on water (Xue et al., 2023), and the implementation of the He-Zhang system — the River Chiefs system — is a response to poor interdepartmental coordination. In this system, local authorities are responsible for water quality and management, operating within a multi-level system (Liu & Richards, 2018). In this system, the state holds residual control rights over resources, reinforcing a top-down management structure and subordinating use rights to higher-level administrative decisions (Wang et al., 2017).
The 13th Five-Year Plan (2016), reinforced by legislation such as the Yangtze and Yellow River Protection Laws, establishes specific efficiency targets for water use and quality management (Stratfor/RANE, 2024). Furthermore, the Five-Year Plan for Water Security (2021–2025) promotes the use of technologies and the integration of monitoring systems via the Internet of Things (IoT) and encourages the development of “sponge cities” (Stratfor/RANE, 2024; Liu & Richards, 2018).
There are budgetary constraints for implementing these measures, and water governance still faces tensions between centralization and local autonomy, economic growth, and environmental sustainability goals. Furthermore, the complexity of institutional structures, overlapping responsibilities among ministries, and fragmented data collection hinder efficient integrated water management (Wang et al., 2017; Jia & Li, 2021).
Therefore, significant challenges remain that hinder more coherent policy implementation, and the lack of integration of governance structures hinders a coordinated response to water crises. Furthermore, uneven implementation of policies across regions is observed, compromising the effectiveness of national regulations in local contexts: in less developed areas, the application of regulations is often symbolic (Jia & Li, 2021).
In China, water security is not limited to the domestic context, given that the country has significant influence over the region’s transboundary waters. China is the source of several major Asian rivers, such as the Mekong, Brahmaputra, Irrawaddy, and Salween, which supply water to millions of people in India, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand. This upstream position implies strategic advantages, particularly in the absence of robust regional regulations regulating shared water use (Ogden, 2023; Zhao et al., 2023). Thus, the country’s water management and infrastructure policies directly impact its neighbors, generating power asymmetries, diplomatic disputes, and, in some cases, tensions. This external dimension is part of a regional landscape of geopolitical rivalries, energy interests, and climate change.
The examples of the Mekong and Brahmaputra basins illustrate this point. As an upstream country in the Mekong basin, China is not a member of the river’s governance committee and has built dams that control large volumes of water flow. These projects are designed to ensure energy security, but they generate seasonal impacts on downstream countries (Ogden, 2023). Studies indicate a form of Chinese hydro-hegemony in the region, considering its physical, political, and institutional dominance over regional water flows (Liz-Rivas, 2021; Zeitoun & Warner, 2006). Chinese diplomacy has promoted forums such as the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Mechanism, where it holds power over the other members. These environments offer space for dialogue but reinforce China’s centrality in the regional water regime (Ogden, 2023).
The waters of the Brahmaputra, a river that originates in Tibet and is shared with India, are also a source of tension, along with historical tensions in Sino-Indian relations over territorial disputes. Although there are agreements to share hydrological data during the monsoon season, there is no formal, more comprehensive treaty between the two countries. In times of diplomatic crisis, China has unilaterally suspended data transfers to India, exacerbating suspicions about the reliability of cooperation. In general, China resists signing international treaties that limit its autonomy in water infrastructure projects, a strategy to avoid restrictions on its control of water resources, with bilateral or unilateral solutions based on national interests prevailing (Ogden, 2023; Liz-Rivas, 2021).
Despite this dynamic, emerging cooperation is possible. Relationships in basins shared by China vary in terms of institutionalization, conflict intensity, and presence of cooperative arrangements, ranging from diplomatic tension to the development of strategic interdependencies. In the Yarlung Tsangpo-Brahmaputra basin, there is both cooperation and conflict between China, India, and Bangladesh, including on energy issues, food security, and climate change. Climate and energy imperatives are catalysts for technical cooperation, however, this cooperation remains fragile, limited to informal bilateral agreements and lacking binding mechanisms or institutional structures for dispute resolution (Zhao et al., 2023). Cooperation in the Mekong basin is more formalized, albeit asymmetrical. As a non-member, China participates in technical discussions of the Mekong River Commission (MRC), but is not subject to the same legal obligations as its full members.
Energy security also fosters regional cooperation. The interconnection of electricity grids in South Asia, with the possibility of a regional energy market, signals a trend toward integrating the water-energy-food nexus into more robust cooperative structures (Saklani et al., 2020). As Zeitoun and Warner (2006) suggest, water-related relations often occur within asymmetric power structures, which can evolve into the possibility of coordination in situations where there are visible mutual gains, institutionalized communication channels, and interdependent trust. Therefore, there is a window of opportunity for China to ensure its water security, but also to assume a more collaborative role in building multilateral mechanisms for the governance of the basins it shares with its neighbors.
Thus, water security in China combines institutional advances with persistent challenges. The country has a solid regulatory framework with innovative legislation, mechanisms, and measures aligned with the concept of ecological civilization. Despite this progress, the country faces challenges. Internally, there is inequality in water distribution between regions, the impacts of extreme events, and structural problems such as pollution and institutional fragmentation. The centralized government response invests in large-scale solutions, which face criticism for their high costs and difficulty in implementing in diverse local contexts.
Externally, China wields significant influence over key transboundary basins, including the Mekong and Brahmaputra. Its stance favors unilateral control of water flows, with little adherence to multilateral treaties. This strengthens its regional power but generates tensions with riparian countries. Nevertheless, regional technical cooperation initiatives are emerging, driven by climate risks and increasing energy interdependence. Thus, it can be concluded that Chinese water security is a strategic component of its domestic and foreign policy. To ensure long-term sustainability, it will be necessary to move toward more integrated, transparent, and cooperative governance models.
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Matilde de Souza: Professor of the Postgraduate Program and the Department of International Relations at PUC Minas. Contact: matilde@pucminas.br.
Maria Silveira: Undergraduate student in International Relations at PUC Minas — Poços de Caldas. Contact: mariasilveira.ri@gmail.com.