2024 Presidential election in Tunisia: context and prospects
Aline Alencar
Abstract: On 6 October 2024, tunisians went to the polls to elect a new president. The event happened under the context of the increasing authoritarianism of current president Kais Saied, democratically elected in 2019. The piece discusses the context and prospects of the election.
On 6 October 2024, Tunisians went to the polls to elect a new president. What could be celebrated as a high expression of democracy though happened in a very distinct context as one would expect in the country celebrated as the only democracy to have blossomed from the Arab Spring.
During 10 years, from 2011 to 2021, Tunisia experienced a democratization process based on regular cycles of free and fair elections (legislative, executive and municipal), a progressive constitution, the proliferation of regulatory institutions, a robust civil society, and free press. Overall, national dialogues and political pacts have permitted the transition to progress peacefully despite political stalemates.
However, this progressive journey was reversed on 25 July 2021, when president elect Kais Saied, capitalizing on people’s discontentment over the lack of economic progress, initiated an authoritarian turn (Grewal 2021). After invoking a controversial interpretation of the constitution in order to assume full control of the state, the president moved to gradually dismantle several pillars of the democratic system: he froze the parliament, moved to rule by decrees, imposed a hyper-presidential constitution, and undermined electoral and judicial independence (Human Rights Watch 2021; The Guardian 2022; Abouaoun, Hill, and Siebert 2022; Human Rights Watch 2023). Not least, freedom of expression and the press have been severely curbed, with several lawyers, journalists, bloggers, and political opponents prosecuted or jailed (Amnesty International 2024).
Kais Saied was democratically elected in 2019 with a landslide vote, along with a divided parliament (Chrisafis 2019). He was an independent university law instructor, with no previous experience in formal politics, who presented a radical program to restructure the system into a bottom-up direct democracy. His populist anti-political party rhetoric and personal face-to-face styled campaign gained resonance in a population disillusioned with the delay of the promises the revolution happened for. His power grab was met with astonishing popular approval and lack of assertive international condemnation, giving him room to proceed setting up an ultra-presidential regime unchallenged.
It is against this backdrop that the 6 October elections took place. Many candidates announced their intention to run, and 17 of them officially submitted their candidacy files before the 6 August deadline. However, only two beside Saied were accepted by the Independent Superior Electoral Body (ISIE), whose members are appointed by the president himself (The Arab Weekly). The list of others would-be presidential candidates whom the Saied regime has incarcerated, exiled, or prosecuted is long (France 24 2024). For instance, Abir Moussi, leader of Ben Ali’s successor Free Destourian Party (PDL) and regarded as a potential candidate, was given a two-year jail sentence for criticizing the ISIE (Al Jazeera 2023). Along all the political spectrum, from the Islamists to the left and the Destour family, the opposition has been calling the legitimacy of these elections into question.
Differently from previous elections though, this time traditional opposition parties were divided over whether to boycott or not the elections. While some prominent figures stick to the boycott strategy, such as Hamma Hammami of the Workers’ Party, others have come to the conclusion that it could be beneficial to use the presidential election as an opportunity to turn the page on Kais Saied’s rule. Indeed, as political scientists Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way show, boycotting elections in authoritarian regimes might not always be a good idea, since they are one of the four institutions (along with the legislature, the judiciary, and the media) to provide “arenas of contestation” through which authoritarian incumbents can be periodically challenged and weaken (Levitsky and Lucan 2002). After three rounds of elections, one assertive part of Tunisian opposition seems to have understood that.
One of the competitors in the electoral dispute was Zouhair Maghzaoui, Secretary General of the Arab nationalist “People’s Movement” party, who was former supporter of Kais Saied. He was favorable to the 25 July coup d’état and the entire process that followed, having been a vocal support of a “yes” vote for the 2022 referendum to replace the 2014 revolutionary constitution. For some observers heard by the author, his victory would have probably mean the continuation of the status quo. The alternative was Ayachi Zammel, businessman and former MP elected in 2019 on the lists of the bourguibist Tahya Tounes. With a discourse that announces the support to all political prisoners and the slogan “turning the page”, he has been appointed by the democratic opposition as the liberal alternative to Saied and a possible path to gain democracy back. Zammel, however, has been sentenced on charges of falsifying documents a few days before the polls (Al Jazeera 2024)
With a whole electoral process lacking neutrality and legitimacy, the prospects to unseat Kais Saied thus dim. In fact, Kais Saied has been reelected with over 90 percent of the vote. This score however does not provide evidence of Kais Saied’s real approval. The truth is that the Tunisian public has been largely disengaged from politics. With years of a precarious economy and claims of corruption, many have lost faith in the political system. The past legislative and local elections saw record abstention rates approaching 90% (The Guardian 2023), and this time it was no different: 27.7% of the electors cast ballots in the third presidential ballot in the democratic period (Le Monde 2024). Tellingly, when talking to people on the streets previous to the elections, many not even knew the candidates that were running. Many people still believe Saied’s populist, conspiratorial rhetoric, which blames the political class, the international community, and the sub-Sahara migrants for the country’s ills. Those might not necessarily be trustful of Saied, but believe there is no alternative.
The future of Tunisia is uncertain. Yet restoring democracy is not impossible. There has been an increasing activism in the country, with more people showing discontent with Saied’s authoritarianism. Energetic protesters have bustled in the city center in the past months demanding the restoration of freedom of speech and the rule of law, signaling that Tunisians have kept their revolutionary spirit and are ready to chant for dignity and freedom (RFI 2024). Measuring Saied’s true popularity today is difficult with polls banned during election periods, but the abstention rates of past elections show his popular support is not unconditional. The economic aspect can also play against his popularity. His capacity to rely on international goodwill to alleviate the economy has diminished with the series of high-profile political arrests and accusations of racism against black migrants (Cordall 2023). Without international help, the economy will continue to deteriorate unless Saied implements painful economic reforms. In both scenarios, his popularity will most probably be seriously hit. At last, widespread dissatisfaction could help cross the current disengagement between the people protesting and the apathetic wider population, playing in favor of democratic mobilization in the country. As Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way pose, the ballots could then be a successful arena of contestation. Or maybe the streets.
References
Abouaoun, Elie, Thomas M Hill, and Leo Siebert. “Tunisia’s New Constitution Expands Presidential Power. What’s next for Its Democracy?” United States Institute of Peace, July 28, 2022. https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/07/tunisias-new-constitution-expands-presidential-power-whats-next-its-democracy.
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Al Jazeera. “Tunisian Presidential Candidate Zammel Sentenced to Six Months in Prison.” Al Jazeera, September 26, 2024. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/9/26/tunisian-presidential-candidate-zammel-sentenced-to-six-months-in-prison.
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The Arab Weekly. “Tunisia’s Electoral Body Limits Candidacies to Three, Including Incumbent.” Published October 18, 2024. https://thearabweekly.com/tunisias-electoral-body-limits-candidacies-three-including-incumbent.
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The Guardian. “Tunisian Election Records 11% Turnout in Rejection of President’s Reforms.” The Guardian, January 30, 2023. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/30/tunisian-election-records-11-turnout-in-rejection-of-presidents-reforms.
About the Author
Aline Alencar: research fellow at the Center for Global Studies of University of Brasília. She holds a PhD degree in Political Sciences from the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg (2022), a MA degree in International Relations from the University of Brasília (2015), a BA degree in International Relations in the same university (2009), and a BA degree in Economic Sciences and Management from the University of Rouen (2008). She was research assistent at the German foundation Hanns Seidel for the Maghreb, in Tunis. Her research interests are democratic transition, democratic backsliding, political parties, political ideologies, religious movements, Political Islam, and Midle East and North African politics and society.